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After nearly ªfteen
years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is seeking to reorient
its approach to counterinsurgency (COIN). Rather than intervening with U.S.
forces, the United States wants to focus on supporting local governments’
counterinsurgency efforts with offers of aid and advice.1 Without U.S. troops
on the ground capable of independent action, success will depend on the poli-
cies and choices of the client government. Herein lies the problem. This ap-
proach, and U.S. thinking on COIN in general, does not acknowledge the
difªculty of convincing local governments to follow U.S. counterinsurgency
prescriptions. Despite a shared aim of defeating an insurgency, the historical
record suggests that the interests and priorities of the United States and a local
partner can diverge signiªcantly. Maintaining power is frequently a compet-
ing priority for the incumbent regime, making many of the standard reform
prescriptions—streamlining the military chain of command, ending patron-
age politics, engaging in economic reform, or embracing disaffected minority
groups—as threatening to the besieged government as the insurgency itself.2
Although analysts in the United States have spent much time and effort in re-
cent years trying to divine the key to success in counterinsurgency, they have
not given the same level attention to understanding when a local government
will follow U.S. guidance.
The Barack Obama administration’s 2015 decision to expand the training
of Iraqi forces ªghting the Islamic State gives added salience to the question of
how to shape the counterinsurgency policies of a local government that the
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United States is supporting.3 This problem, however, has plagued U.S. coun-
terinsurgency assistance efforts for more than ªve decades. Writing before
the “Americanization” of the Vietnam War, the senior adviser to the South
Vietnamese I Corps warned in his end-of-tour report that “the development of
techniques and means to increase U.S. leverage in Vietnam is the single most
important problem facing us there and it will be a fundamental problem in any
future counterinsurgency effort in which we become involved.”4 Since then,
numerous critics have noted that despite providing partner governments with
huge amounts of money and material to support their counterinsurgency op-
erations, the United States has displayed an inability to convince them to fol-
low its counterinsurgency doctrine or address what it considers to be the
political and economic “root causes” of their insurgencies.5
The failure to recognize the problem of divergent interests between patron
and client stems, in part, from the general assumption in the counterinsur-
gency literature that counterinsurgent forces are unitary actors. Consequently,
scholars have not integrated issues of alliance behavior into their studies of the
dynamics of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary war.6 Focusing on indi-
rect interventions to support local governments with aid and advice, this arti-
cle examines a patron’s ability to shape a client state’s strategy and behavior
in counterinsurgency.
The ªrst section of this article uses agency theory to explore the potentially
divergent preferences of patrons and their local clients in a counterinsurgency
support effort. The second section examines the relative leverage generated by
two distinct aid-giving strategies: inducement, which assumes that the unilat-
eral provision of assistance to a client, coupled with strong public statements
of support, will be reciprocated by compliance with a patron’s preferred poli-
cies; and conditionality, which tries to shape the client’s behavior by making
delivery of assistance contingent on a client’s prior implementation of a pa-
tron’s preferred policies. The third section analyzes the relative utility of these
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two strategies in a case study of U.S. support to the government of El Salvador
during that country’s twelve-year civil war (1979–92), which is based on exten-
sive archival research, including recently declassiªed materials. The fourth
section evaluates sixteen discrete inºuence episodes during the civil war and
concludes that the client government complied with U.S. preferences when the
United States attached conditions, but not when it provided inducements. It
also examines the challenge of making credible threats to withhold aid from
clients being supported in COIN. The conclusion summarizes the ªndings and
offers some recommendations for effectively employing conditionality in fu-
ture counterinsurgency assistance efforts.7
The Trouble with Allies in Counterinsurgency
Much of the United States’ experience with counterinsurgency has involved
assisting another government in combating an insurgency. Yet, the challenges
entailed in working with a partner nation are not widely recognized in the
counterinsurgency literature. Classical counterinsurgency theorists, such as
the inºuential British counterinsurgency expert Robert Thompson, have im-
plicitly assumed that the preferences and goals of the host-nation government
and its supporting partner will be closely aligned.8 This belief is reºected in
the 2006 U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency ªeld manual, FM 3-24,
which shaped the thinking of U.S. political and military leaders on civil wars
for nearly a decade.9 The manual asserts that “the primary objective of any
COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legiti-
mate government.”10 Toward that end, U.S. forces were enjoined to build
trust with host-nation authorities and work closely with them to enhance
their legitimacy by undertaking reform and responding to popular grievances.
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7. The topic under examination is the relative utility of inducement and conditionality to
inºuence the behavior of a client state in counterinsurgency. Why a patron chooses one particular
inºuence approach over another and under which conditions these approaches would be more or
less effective are extremely important questions for future research, but answering them is beyond
the scope of the present research design.
8. See, for example, Robert Thompson’s comments on the subject in Thompson, “Civic Action in
Low-Intensity Warfare,” in Proceedings of the Low Intensity Warfare Conference (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Defense, 1986), p. 74.
9. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of the Army, 2006).
10. Ibid., p. 37. The 2014 edition of FM 3-24 recognizes that a local government’s interests may not
always coincide with those of the United States. It does not, however, examine in great detail the
difªculty of inºuencing a local government to adopt U.S. counterinsurgency principles. See De-
partment of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of the Army, 2014), pp. 1–8, 10–15.
No suggestion is made that these goals might not be in the interest of the rul-
ing government.11
In recent experience, however, the United States’ local partners in Iraq and
Afghanistan have often sought to subvert U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. An
inability to restrain Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian agenda
prevented the military gains from the 2007 surge from being translated into
positive political outcomes and laid the foundation for the rise of the Islamic
State.12 In Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai’s use of patronage politics
was seen by outsiders as a form of corruption, which undercut public support
for the very government that U.S. and NATO forces were trying to assist. The
inability of the United States to shape the Afghan government’s behavior led
one European diplomat to marvel that “never in history has any superpower
spent so much money, sent so many troops to a country, and had so little
inºuence over what its president says and does.”13 FM 3-24’s assumption of a
unanimity of interests between patron and client was clearly misplaced.
This misalignment of counterinsurgency priorities is a variant of the classic
principal-agent problem that occurs when one party delegates responsibility
for carrying out a task to another in an environment of asymmetric informa-
tion.14 In such relationships, the interests of the principal are not completely
aligned with those of the agent. For example, employers generally want their
employees to work hard all day long; employees, on the other hand, may pre-
fer to get paid for shirking their responsibilities, particularly if they know their
employer may not catch them in the act. This is not to suggest that the employ-
ees (agents) are lazy, evil, or stupid, merely that they are strategic actors, seek-
ing to achieve their own goals within the restrictions put upon them by their
employer (the principal).15
A primary challenge in assisting another nation in counterinsurgency is that
the patron and the client have independent goals and priorities. Broadly
speaking, both the United States and the local government may want to see an
insurgency defeated. Retaining power is a competing priority for the client
International Security 41:1 102
11. Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Po-
litical Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2008), p. 348.
12. Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,” Atlantic, September 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2015/09/the-surge-fallacy/399344/.
13. Rod Nordland, Melissa J. Rubin, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Gulf Widens between U.S. and a
More Volatile Karzai,” New York Times, March 17, 2012.
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(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 3.
government, however, which puts a premium on continuing the domestic so-
cial and economic arrangements that beneªt its core supporters, even if these
same measures are driving support for the insurgency. A client state may ac-
cept external assistance to pursue its interests, but this is more frequently the
result of necessity than choice.16 The client will try to manipulate the dynamics
of the relationship with its patron to maximize the amount of political, eco-
nomic, or military assistance it receives, while seeking to maintain its auton-
omy. As a result, a key source of frustration for American policymakers when
assisting a state’s counterinsurgency efforts is the inability to get the client to
comply with U.S. counterinsurgency prescriptions.17 In reality, the local gov-
ernment is an independent agent and the power supporting it has, at best, only
indirect control over its client’s economic, political, and military policies.
As Thomas Grant notes, “It is rare to have a morally splendid ally in
counterinsurgency work, simply because morally pristine, administratively ef-
fective governments do not provide the inspiration or excuse for a guerrilla
war.”18 Thus, assisting counterinsurgency suffers from what is known in
principal-agent parlance as “adverse selection,” because the only governments
needing external assistance to combat domestic political opponents are al-
most by deªnition ºawed in some key respects—be they incompetent, fraudu-
lent, abusive, or all of the above. The same governmental shortcomings that
facilitate the emergence of an insurgency also undercut the effectiveness of the
counterinsurgent response.
The local government is unlikely, however, to be eager to address these
problems of its own volition. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith
have argued, the behavior of political leaders is based primarily on their desire
for political survival: “Decisions are not taken to improve the welfare of the
people unless coincidentally this simultaneously aids survival.”19 The priority
for a besieged government is often to bolster its position within its society by
ensuring that the leadership of the state’s security forces is too divided to
mount a coup, using economic patronage to co-opt rival elites who could pose
a threat, and restricting political decisionmaking to trusted loyalists—all of
which are likely to diminish counterinsurgency effectiveness. Consequently,
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18. Thomas A. Grant, “Government, Politics, and Low-Intensity Conºict,” in Edwin G. Corr and
Stephen Sloan, eds., Low-Intensity Conºict: Old Threats in a New World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1992), p. 261.
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Conºict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2007), p. 254.
Daniel Byman warns that “U.S. COIN doctrine, no matter how well thought
out, cannot succeed without the appropriate political and other reforms
from the host nation, but these regimes are likely to subvert the reforms that
threaten the existing power structure.”20
This leads to the second principal-agent problem that a patron state faces,
what economists have termed “moral hazard.” In this situation, possessing in-
surance against risk inadvertently leads a party to act less carefully than it oth-
erwise would have because it does not bear the full consequences of its
actions.21 By providing assistance, the patron state can alter the burden of risk
in a way that might unintentionally change the behavior of the local govern-
ment. If a regime believes that an external power is committed to its survival,
it can ignore the potential risks of its own actions (or lack thereof), conªdent
that the patron will protect it from harm if the situation deteriorates too far.
Absent the ability to compel a client to address the various shortcomings that
facilitated the outbreak of an insurgency, some critics contend that external as-
sistance can sap the local government’s motivation to defeat the insurgents on
its own or undertake the reforms that such aid was intended to encourage.
Consequently, external support can render a supported government less stable
than it might otherwise have been.22 These different priorities can produce a
situation in which the intervening power supports a regime that refuses to im-
plement its counterinsurgency prescriptions and may even seek to free ride,
forcing the patron to bear the costs of ªghting the insurgents.
Shirking by an agent can never be completely prevented; however, agency
theory identiªes several tools for mitigating principal-agent problems. The
preferred means is to carefully screen agents and select only those whose pref-
erences closely align with those of the principal.23 A patron assisting a client
state in counterinsurgency, however, rarely has the option of selecting an opti-
mal agent beforehand. Therefore, the next-best solution is to shape the client’s
behavior through the offer of inducements or the threat of sanctions. This topic
is taken up in the subsequent section.
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Patron-Client Inºuence Strategies
The literature on international patron-client relationships focuses on the
inºuence dynamics between patron and client, yet it has not previously been
brought to bear on the challenge of shaping a smaller partner’s behavior in
counterinsurgency. This body of scholarship, which reached its apogee in the
last decade of the Cold War, emphasizes the reciprocal nature of the relation-
ship between a great power and a client state. Although their relationship
many be not formally codiªed as an alliance, the patron and the client each
has something the other desires, often economic, military, or diplomatic aid on
the one hand and loyalty and compliance on the other.24 When it comes to the
question of inºuencing a client, and given that both sides value the consensual
partnership, some scholars argue that coercion will not play a role in bilateral
relations, nor will a patron exploit its superior strength to command obedience
from its client.25 Instead, the patron achieves compliance by providing its cli-
ent with inducements to change its behavior.26
A second group of scholars of international patron-client relations accepts
the basic premise that bilateral relations are consensual and mutually valued.
They note, however, that as utility maximizers clients do not readily recipro-
cate their patron’s aid. Rather, they “generally seek maximum support in ex-
change for minimal concessions.”27 Consequently, within the context of an
overall benign relationship between patron and client, shaping a client’s be-
havior requires more coercive tools.28
The remainder of this section explores in greater detail the logic of the use of
inducements and conditions on aid to inºuence a client state.
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and John Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York:
Praeger, 1984), p. 20.
26. Bercovitch, “Superpowers and Client States,” p. 16; and Joseph Helman, “The Politics of Pa-
tron-Client State Relationships,” Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 2002, p. 316.
27. John D. Ciorciari, “A Chinese Model for Patron-Client Relations? The Sino-Cambodian Part-
nership,” International Relations of the Asia-Paciªc, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2015), p. 248.
28. Abraham Ben-Zvi, The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 2; and Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships,”
p. 44.
inducement
Inducement strategies focus on a patron’s use of aid to encourage its client
to undertake speciªc actions. Patronage can include intangible beneªts, such
as security guarantees and diplomatic backing, as well as tangible ones such as
military hardware and economic aid. As Celia Reynolds and Wilfred Wan de-
scribe, “Senders use positive inducements as persuasive measures to cajole
the recipient into changing its behavior.”29 Given the cooperative relationship
between the two parties, unilateral grants of aid are expected to generate po-
sitive reciprocity and cooperative behavior from the recipient.30 Moreover,
because such incentives can mitigate the client’s cost of undertaking a policy
change desired by the patron, proponents believe that these incentives will in-
crease the chances of compliance.31 Beªtting a strategy that seeks to gain inºu-
ence through the unilateral provision of aid, inducement strategies favor
public and unambiguous commitments to client states to gain their trust and
bolster their conªdence.
In the context of patron-client relations, inducements have a number of char-
acteristics to recommend them. Unlike sanctions, they do not require multilat-
eral cooperation to be effective; inducements can succeed unilaterally.32
Moreover, from a reputational standpoint, a target state may ªnd it easier to
accede to an incentive than to acquiesce to a threat.33 Finally, unlike more coer-
cive approaches, inducements help to maintain friendly relations between the
states involved, which is important in the context of patron-client relations.34
Past scholarship on the use of this approach by the United States ªnds that
inducements were generally met with reciprocity from the other party and
that positive sanctions have a better track record in inºuencing a target state’s
behavior than punitive pressures.35 Among U.S. policymakers, William Mott
International Security 41:1 106
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 58.
30. Tit-for-tat strategies produce optimum outcomes in an iterative prisoners’ dilemma game. See
Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
31. William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1996), p. 11.
32. David Cortright, “Incentives and Cooperation in International Affairs,” in Cortright, ed., The
Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conºict Prevention (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littleªeld,
1997), p. 10.
33. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Inºuence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966),
pp. 70–78.
34. Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York:
Basic Books, 1975), pp. 166–206; and David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World
Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (October 1971), p. 32.
35. Lloyd Jensen, “Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969–1979,” Journal of Conºict Resolution,
Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 273–303; Martin Patchen, Resolving Disputes between Nations:
reports that faith in the efªcacy of inducements has traditionally been
bolstered by the twin beliefs that the client state shares the United States’
priorities and that the provision of aid will result in “a powerful ability to
inºuence the actions and policies of U.S. recipients.”36 U.S. ofªcials believed
that, in a number of counterinsurgency efforts, making unilateral grants of as-
sistance to a local government would create the trust necessary to encourage
the desired political and economic reforms.37
conditionality
In contrast to an inducement strategy, which focuses solely on the provision of
rewards to shape a client’s behavior, conditionality includes a combination
of rewards and threats to suspend or withhold assistance in the absence of cli-
ent compliance.38 The latter measure is a necessary result of the potentially
diminishing utility of foreign aid in generating inºuence.39
David Baldwin reports that the suspension of aid is as successful in inºu-
encing state behavior, if not more so, than are other means, including the use
of military force.40 Conditionality may be particularly suited for dealing with
recalcitrant clients, because economic coercion has been found to be more ef-
fective against friendly states than it has against adversaries.41 The success rate
of World Bank and IMF conditionality to engender economic reform in target
states is mixed; however, the fact that their conditions are typically ex ante—
local governments receive loans and aid after promising to reform but before
any reforms have been implemented—may explain why they have been less
effective at generating compliance.42
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36. William H. Mott IV, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood, 2002), pp. 66, 307.
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Massachusetts.
38. The imposition of such ex-post conditions differs from the approach taken by institutions such
as the World Bank, which typically imposes conditions ex ante.
39. George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), p. 55.
40. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, pp. 318–319.
41. Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 27–35.
42. Paul Collier et al., “Redesigning Conditionality,” World Development, Vol. 25, No. 9 (1997),
pp. 1399–1407; David Dollar and Jakob Svensson, “What Explains the Success or Failure of
As an inºuence strategy, conditionality is not a tool that the United States
has readily turned to when managing client states. On the face of it, sanc-
tioning or coercing a partner government appears to run contrary to the
point of assisting it in counterinsurgency. Coercion is for adversaries, not al-
lies.43 Moreover, even when a patron wishes to shape a client’s behavior,
several scholars report that patrons are remarkably hesitant to exercise their
potential leverage over smaller allies to actively inºuence their policy choices
because they are often unsure of the degree of inºuence they actually have
over their clients.44
U.S. Inºuence in the Salvadoran Civil War
This section tests the competing logics of inducement and conditionality
against evidence from the U.S. effort to support the Salvadoran govern-
ment against the insurgents of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(FMLN) from 1979 to 1992. This is one of the longest and most expansive
cases of the United States providing aid and support to a local counterinsur-
gency effort short of the full-scale commitment of combat troops. Moreover,
El Salvador has been identiªed by both scholars and the U.S. military as a tem-
plate for future counterinsurgency assistance missions.45
The El Salvador case is ideal for testing both the inducement and condition-
ality strategies because the United States pursued both at different times
during the civil war with varying degrees of success in inºuencing the behav-
ior of the local government.46 The case contains sixteen discrete inºuence epi-
sodes, each beginning with the Salvadoran government or military actively
opposing U.S. entreaties for reform, reorganization, or policy change, thus in-
dicating that compliance was not its preferred course of action. Congruence, a
within-case tool of causal inference, is employed to assess the relative effec-
tiveness of inducement and conditionality in inºuencing the degree to which
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versity Press, 2009), p. 187.
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the Salvadoran government implemented speciªc political, military, or eco-
nomic reform measures favored by the United States as part of El Salvador’s
counterinsurgency strategy.47 The Salvadoran government undertook impor-
tant reforms and policy changes when the United States attached strict condi-
tions to its delivery of aid, but not when inducements were given. To avoid
spurious correlation, the study is also alert to any external shocks that could
explain the client’s changed behavior. Although this study employs multiple
observations, any theoretical proposition derived from or tested against a
single case can run afoul of omitted variable bias or interaction effects. At
a minimum, this analysis can provide circumstantial evidence of the respon-
siveness of a client regime to a patron’s preferences under alternate inºuence
strategies in one of the most signiªcant U.S. counterinsurgency assistance ef-
forts on record.
the carter years, 1979–80
Challenged by both Marxist guerrillas and reactionary death squads, during
the 1980s the Salvadoran government suffered from corruption, widespread
human rights abuses by state security forces, and a lack of democratic legiti-
macy. Hoping to prevent the government from falling to either the extreme left
or the far right, the United States sought to strengthen the military and encour-
age democratization and socioeconomic reforms that could bolster the re-
gime’s legitimacy and reduce popular support for revolution. Twelve years of
U.S. aid and advice allowed the Salvadoran government, which had been on
the brink of collapse in late 1979, to withstand the insurgency and eventually
conclude an externally brokered peace agreement. This outcome was achieved,
however, at the cost of $6 billion in U.S. economic and military aid and some
75,000 Salvadoran lives.
The Salvadoran economy of the late 1970s was built around the export of
labor-intensive crops such as coffee, cotton, and sugar—an undertaking
dominated by a landed oligarchy. As the smallest state in Latin America,
El Salvador had the region’s highest population density, and agriculture could
not provide sufªcient income for the country’s growing rural population.
Consequently, only Haiti and Guatemala had worse living standards in the re-
gion for the poorest of society.48 With the support of the staunchly anticommu-
nist upper and upper-middle classes, a series of military-led governments
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had dominated the country’s political affairs since the 1930s.49 Paramilitary
police maintained order in the countryside, employing physical intimidation
tactics and a grassroots network of informants to identify and eliminate poten-
tial subversives.
The country’s most important institution was the Armed Forces of
El Salvador (ESAF), whose 500-man ofªcer corps provided the leadership for
both the army and the state’s security forces, the latter composed of three para-
military police agencies: the National Police, the National Guard, and the
Treasury Police. In theory, control of the armed forces was highly centralized
in the ofªce of the defense minister; in practice, however, the defense minis-
ter’s authority depended on the concurrence of the heads of the security forces
and the quasi-autonomous military commanders of El Salvador’s fourteen de-
partments (provinces).50
A global plunge in the price of coffee in 1978 economically destabilized large
portions of the countryside. In the wake of the July 1979 revolution in neigh-
boring Nicaragua, demands for change in El Salvador among labor unions,
peasant groups, students, and segments of the Catholic Church grew stronger
and more radical. This dynamic political environment saw the emergence of
no fewer than ªve revolutionary groups, each with its own guerrilla faction as
well an overt political wing capable of marshaling tens of thousands of dem-
onstrators.51 To stave off rebellion, a movement of reform-minded junior of-
ªcers overthrew the government in October 1979, establishing a civilian-led
junta that included members of centrist and left-wing opposition parties.
The Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno promised to equitably distribute na-
tional wealth, to rein in the security forces, and to hold “genuinely free
elections” in 1982 for a constituent assembly, which would write a new consti-
tution for the country.52 To improve El Salvador’s human rights environ-
ment, the junta purged 80 ofªcers and 1,400 enlisted men accused of human
rights abuses.53
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Although the coup had been virtually unopposed, only 20 percent of the
ofªcer corps strongly supported radical change. The vast majority begrudg-
ingly supported the minimum reforms necessary to prevent a revolution,
and the reformers were quickly outmaneuvered in the struggle for control
of the armed forces.54 In the ensuing months, as demonstrations and anti-
government protests continued, repression against trade unionists, students,
members of peasant federations, and other dissidents escalated and state-
linked political murders spiked.55 By January 1980, all of the civilian members
of the junta had resigned, blaming the defense minister, Col. José Guillermo
García, for obstructing their reform agenda and for the ongoing violence by
the security forces.56
While the junta imploded, the far left consolidated. In December 1979, the
Cuban government brought together the leaders of the ªve Salvadoran revolu-
tionary groups to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. Collec-
tively, the FMLN possessed 4,000 guerrilla ªghters backed by 5,000 part-time
militiamen and a political wing that could put 200,000 demonstrators on the
streets.57 It received weapons, military training, and assistance from neighbor-
ing Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East
Germany, and Vietnam.58
conditional aid preserves the junta. The Carter administration’s aim
in El Salvador was to prevent either the far left or the extreme right from seiz-
ing power; support the junta’s economic and political reforms, which could re-
duce popular support for a revolution as well as weaken the power of the
oligarchy; and reduce state-linked violence by bringing the security forces un-
der the junta’s control. To preserve a centrist government, the administration
brokered a deal with the military to allow José Napoléon Duarte’s Christian
Democrat Party (PDC) to rejoin the junta. This was hardly an easy bargain to
make because widespread electoral fraud engineered by the military denied
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Duarte victory in the 1972 presidential election, and the two sides had
been bitter enemies for more than two decades. Nevertheless, Carter’s envoy,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Cheek, informed all parties that U.S.
aid was contingent on the PDC joining the military as a partner in the govern-
ment.59 As Cheek later recounted, U.S. leverage over the ESAF derived almost
solely from “conditional promises of future assistance.”60
The coalition, U.S. observers described, was a highly tenuous “marriage of
convenience” that was “driven by a sense of mutual need but with important
differences of orientation.”61 The military wanted to focus on restoring law
and order, whereas the Christian Democrats pushed economic and social re-
forms as the answer to El Salvador’s problems.62 Both groups viewed the
other’s approach as ill conceived. As the PDC’s price for joining the govern-
ment, the military agreed to nationalize the banking sector; control the export
of coffee, cotton, and sugar; expropriate 2 million acres of farmland for pur-
chase by sharecroppers and agricultural co-ops; and end repression against
the population.63 To support these reforms, which would greatly diminish the
power of the country’s landed oligarchy, the U.S. government pledged
$5.7 million in nonlethal military aid and $50 million in economic assistance.64
Although Carter administration ofªcials believed that a violent challenge by
the far left posed the greatest threat to the junta’s survival, the FMLN was
not the junta’s only enemy.65 El Salvador’s large landowners and certain seg-
ments of the business community violently opposed the junta’s reforms,
particularly the redistribution of highly productive agricultural land to share-
croppers and co-ops.66 Taking a page from its communist foes, the far right or-
ganized its own overt political and clandestine military wings. Their public
face was Robert D’Aubuisson, a charismatic military intelligence ofªcer who
had been purged by the junta.67 Leading “an anti-Communist crusade” on na-
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tional television, he denounced Christian Democrats and reform-minded mili-
tary ofªcers as subversives.68 Many of those whom D’Aubuisson named were
subsequently murdered by the far right’s covert military wing, the so-called
death squads. The majority of these right-wing paramilitaries comprised
active-duty or retired members of the police and military intelligence, func-
tioning, according to the Central Intelligence Agency, “with or without the
knowledge of immediate superiors.”69 In 1980, political killings would claim
more than 8,000 lives, 90 percent of which were attributed to the security
forces and the death squads.70 Among the victims were several reform-minded
military ofªcers; the country’s archbishop, Oscar Romero; the attorney gen-
eral; and hundreds of PDC activists.
By early 1980, rumors had begun to circulate that Defense Minister García
was planning to seize control of the junta to avert a coup by the far right.71 In
response, the Carter administration warned the ESAF high command that
it would withdraw its recent promise of $50 million in economic aid and
$5.7 million in nonlethal military assistance if the government was over-
thrown. D’Aubuisson urged the military not to be intimidated by such threats;
the need for U.S. assistance, however, proved compelling, as Defense Minister
García publicly pledged support for the junta and its reform program.72
the helicopter deal and leverage lost. With a coup temporarily averted,
the Carter administration turned its attention to El Salvador’s security
forces. A debate over the best way to restrain their repressive measures was
initiated by a Salvadoran request to lease six surplus Vietnam-era transport
helicopters—to compensate for the army’s limited ground mobility—and to
deploy American technicians to maintain them.73 Despite their immediate util-
ity, the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White, advocated condition-
ality, arguing that the helicopters should not be given “until the worst of the
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right-wing violence is brought to an end.” Otherwise, such a visible U.S. com-
mitment would bolster the military at the expense of the civilians in the
junta.74 While sharing White’s goals, Deputy Assistant Secretary Cheek argued
for an inducement strategy: the United States should quickly dispatch the heli-
copters and technicians to signal the credibility of its commitment, which was
necessary if the United States hoped to separate the ESAF from its “traditional
patrons on the far right.”75 Contrary to White, Cheek argued that a clear sig-
nal of U.S. support would strengthen reformers relative to the reactionaries,
whereas a failure to provide aid would be interpreted as a lack of enthusiasm
for the junta.76
White’s arguments for conditionality ultimately prevailed. The United
States offered to lease at no cost six helicopters, which the ESAF was “anxious”
to receive “to the point of desperation.” Delivery was conditioned on the
Salvadoran government completing the following ªve steps within sixty
days: (1) issue a directive denouncing the “indiscriminate violence and hu-
man rights violations” occurring in the country, including the repudiation
of the abduction, torture, and execution of suspected subversives; (2) im-
prove command and control of counterinsurgency operations to reduce
abuses; (3) replace senior ofªcers and military units in areas where signiªcant
violence against civilians had occurred; (4) demonstrate a commitment to
suppress the inºuence of the far right, particularly within the military; and
(5) commit to defend the judiciary from intimidation and violence.77
Civilian and military members of the junta found it “galling” that “reforms
were being enforced by another country.” Rather than explicit conditions, they
suggested an informal understanding that the above terms would be imple-
mented if the United States supplied the helicopters and technicians.78 Despite
warnings that delaying delivery of the helicopters endangered the upcoming
coffee harvest, and therefore the country’s fragile economy, the United States
refused to act until it had received the junta’s written reply. In late September
1980, the Salvadoran government ofªcially accepted the U.S. terms.79
In the ensuing months, the ESAF made some progress in meeting the U.S.
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conditions, ofªcially denouncing human rights violations, preparing a code of
conduct for the armed forces condemning the abuse of civilians, and strength-
ening the military chain of command to improve accountability. Conditionality
had compelled Salvadoran military leaders to accept an agreement they did
not like; the credibility of the threat to withhold the helicopters, however, van-
ished with Carter’s crushing loss to Ronald Reagan in November 1980. To
many in El Salvador, Carter’s defeat signaled the end of conditions on U.S.
military aid and the start of a new policy of unconditional support for pro-
American regimes.80
Consequently, the Salvadoran government took no ªrm action against
ofªcers implicated in human rights abuses or involved in the death squads.81
With killings by security forces on the rise, Ambassador White advised the
State Department at the end of the sixty-day monitoring period that “there is
no way that any objective observer could state that the Government has com-
plied with the ªve steps we proposed.”82
aid suspension and junta reorganization. During its last months in
ofªce, the Carter administration attempted to regain leverage over the
Salvadoran government, but its efforts were derailed by the murders of six
U.S. citizens by members of the Salvadoran security forces.83 In the ªrst in-
stance, four American missionaries were raped and killed; in the second, two
American land-reform experts were gunned down in a hotel alongside the
head of the Salvadoran land reform agency.84
The killings provoked immediate outrage in the United States and raised
questions about the degree of inºuence Washington wielded over its erstwhile
client. Although not part of the counterinsurgency effort per se, the murders
became a litmus test for U.S. observers as to whether the Salvadoran military
could ever be convinced to conduct a clean counterinsurgency war. Carter sus-
pended all aid and dispatched a high-level delegation to San Salvador to un-
dertake a ªnal attempt to compel the junta to bring the military under civilian
control, remove hard-liners from positions of authority, and control the death
squads.85 U.S. embassy analysts estimated that without the embargoed aid, the
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government’s military operations—particularly its efforts to protect the coffee
harvest from guerrilla sabotage—would be adversely affected “in a matter of
weeks,” and that the Salvadoran economy could suffer a total collapse within
a month.86
A major weakness of the junta was that its civilian members had little
control over the armed forces. To strengthen the position of the Christian
Democrats vis-à-vis the military, the Carter administration turned to condi-
tionality, announcing it would resume aid if there was a “signiªcant restruc-
turing of the Government and shifts in military personnel.”87 Privately, the
leader of the Christian Democrats, Napoléon Duarte, was informed that if
he could reach an agreement with the military that improved civilian control
over the security forces, reduced indiscriminate killings, and removed several
“hard-liners” from command positions, the United States would release
$95 million in economic aid, start delivery of the helicopters, and deploy up to
ªfty U.S. military trainers to assist the armed forces.88
After several days of intense negotiations, a deal was brokered that
made Duarte president of a reorganized junta and committed the military to
remove from ofªce the vice defense minister, the head of the Treasury Police,
and ten middle-ranking ofªcers associated with extremist violence.89 The
Salvadoran government also pledged to hold free elections in 1982 and urged
the FMLN to peacefully join the political process. As a reward for the partial
implementation of the desired reforms and the promise to purge hard-line
ofªcers, the United States immediately released $67 million in economic aid.90
Former Venezuelan Foreign Minister Arístides Calvani, who was an interlocu-
tor between the military and the PDC during the negotiations, reported that
U.S. conditions on aid “had been an important element in the shaping of the
new agreement.”91
the 1981 ªnal offensive and the end to conditionality. While U.S. eco-
nomic assistance to El Salvador was fast-tracked, nonlethal military aid was
discretely made available on a “phased incremental basis”: tranches would be
delivered based on tangible progress in the investigation of the murders of the
four missionaries, removal of senior ofªcers implicated in signiªcant human
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rights abuses, and a reduction in death squad violence.92 Duarte acknowl-
edged that U.S. conditions on military aid provided him with leverage over
the armed forces, but he urged the Carter administration to wave them in light
of growing evidence that the FMLN was preparing for a “ªnal offensive” to
seize power.93 An interagency split developed within the administration, with
Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer arguing that tying military aid to hu-
man rights issues was akin to “ªddling while Rome burns.” Forestalling an in-
surgent victory in El Salvador had to take priority, Komer insisted; once peace
was restored, “we can later use aid as leverage to enhance human rights.”94
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and Ambassador White took the opposite
view, counseling President Carter that releasing military aid would send “the
wrong signal” to the Salvadoran military, which had already “misinterpreted”
the resumption of economic assistance as a sign that the United States was not
serious about pressing it to purge human rights abusers from its ranks.95
The debate was overtaken by events when, on January 10, 1981, several
thousand guerrilla ªghters launched simultaneous attacks on forty-three lo-
cations across El Salvador. The FMLN initially achieved impressive success,
but its call for “all the people to rise up as one” went unheeded.96 In nine days
of hard ªghting, which nearly exhausted the Salvadoran government’s
stock of munitions and consumables, the ESAF forced the insurgents to surren-
der most of their gains.97 Marred by poor coordination and insufªcient urban
organization, the operation proved a major failure for the insurgents.98
In the wake of the offensive, the Carter administration lifted its conditions
on military aid. As one of his ªnal acts in ofªce, President Carter used the “un-
foreseen emergency” provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act to dispatch
six helicopters; twenty-eight military trainers; and $5.9 million in military
hardware—including new weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition—
to El Salvador without congressional approval.99 By the time the military sup-
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plies began arriving in country, however, the ESAF had regained the initiative
over the insurgents, as Defense Minister García proudly proclaimed, “without
one bullet” from the United States.100
Carter attempted to justify the emergency aid release by citing Salvadoran
compliance with U.S. conditions; Secretary of State Muskie and Ambassador
White, however, disagreed that tangible progress had been made.101 By unilat-
erally abrogating its conditions on military aid, the Carter administration
conªrmed the Salvadoran high command’s long-held belief that the United
States would never risk a break with El Salvador.
the reagan initiative, 1981–84
With the ascent of Ronald Reagan to the presidency, observers in San Salvador
and Washington braced themselves for a major reorientation of U.S. policy.102
Yet, in many respects there was signiªcant continuity, as the new administra-
tion shared its predecessor’s belief that “the alternative to the existing junta to-
day is extremism on either side.”103 Although some of the junta’s economic
reforms, such as the nationalization of the banking sector and the collectiviza-
tion of agriculture, clashed with Reagan’s free-market economic principles, the
administration believed that such measures were succeeding in the political
battle against the insurgency.104 Rather than embracing the Salvadoran right,
within weeks of taking ofªce Reagan approved a proposal to provide covert
ªnancial support to the Christian Democrats and the remaining reform-
minded ofªcers in the junta.105 “Prompt, free, and open” elections were the ad-
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ministration’s solution for broadening the Salvadoran government’s base of
support and enticing both the left and the right to compete for power politi-
cally instead of through force.106 As a result of these continuities, the head of
Latin American policy planning in Carter’s State Department, Luigi Einaudi,
described the Reagan approach as “Carter plus”—the “plus” being enhanced
military aid.107
In February 1981, the United States granted El Salvador $25 million in mili-
tary aid—more than it gave to the rest of Latin America combined—as well as
$74.4 million in economic assistance.108 To give the junta “breathing space”
in its battle with the FMLN, Reagan followed Carter’s lead in invoking an
“unforeseen emergency” to rush modern riºes, machine guns, mortars, medi-
cal equipment, four more helicopters, and an additional twenty-six military
trainers to El Salvador without congressional approval.109 Failure to support
El Salvador, Reagan feared, would not only put Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Panama at risk, but it would harm the credibility of the United States, weaken-
ing U.S. alliances worldwide.110
inducements without results. The Reagan administration’s primary
point of departure from its predecessor was the embrace of an inducement
strategy. Unconditioned aid and unambiguous statements of support for
El Salvador were advised in the belief that dispensing U.S. largesse provided
leverage over the local government, particularly the military, that could be
used to inºuence their behavior.111 In contrast, Reagan ofªcials believed that
the Carter administration had demonstrated that conditions on aid were
“counterproductive,” leading to a “waning” of U.S. inºuence over client
states.112 The government in San Salvador could not count on the United
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States, Secretary of State Al Haig, argued, because “assistance was promised
one day and turned off the next.”113 Such coercive measures should be used to
inºuence hostile states, not friendly ones.114 The administration would con-
tinue to try to convince Salvadoran leaders to reduce human rights abuses by
the security forces and sustain the junta’s reforms, but it would do so using in-
ducements and friendly persuasion rather than conditions on aid.115
The Reagan administration’s new approach produced immediate results—
none positive—as the ESAF reneged on its promise of reform made in
December 1980. The murder investigations stalled; the pace of extrajudicial
killings spiked; hard-line military ofªcers retained their posts; and land reform
was soon “in serious danger of failure.”116 With Robert D’Aubuisson publicly
alleging that there was “high-level Washington support” for a military coup,
Secretary of State Haig ªrmly informed the Salvadorans that the United States
would terminate all military aid if the government was overthrown.117 Again,
the potential loss of military aid spurred Defense Minister García into action.
Publicly warning supporters of the far right in the armed forces that a coup
would “sink” El Salvador, he insisted that “without foreign support, especially
that of the United States, there could be no survival.”118 Similarly, the mission-
ary murder case moved forward, not because of inducements, but because of
threats to withhold aid. In late April 1981, Haig called Duarte to warn him that
growing impatience in the White House and in Congress over the progress
of the case “threatens our ability to continue to assist you.”119 Three days later,
the six guardsmen suspected of the murders were arrested.
congress pushes conditions. Following their failed “ªnal offensive,” the
insurgents retreated to their rural strongholds in the north and east of
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the country and regrouped for a protracted ªght. For the next several years,
12,000–14,000 FMLN guerrillas fought a quasi-conventional war against a
Salvadoran military that grew from 20,000 members in 1980 to 54,000 by the
second half of the decade. The poorly trained Salvadoran army was organized
for a conventional war with neighboring Honduras. To defend against the in-
surgents, the majority of the force was deployed in small units to guard critical
economic infrastructure. Infrequent offensive operations consisted of ponder-
ous, short-duration sweeps of FMLN territory by large units that the guerrillas
easily avoided.120 Instead, local civilians bore the brunt of the armed forces’
brutality under the logic that, in the words of one army commander, “civil-
ians who don’t want to cooperate [with the insurgents] leave the area and
those who remain are collaborating.”121 In December 1981, elements of the
American-trained Atlacatl rapid reaction battalion rampaged through the vil-
lage of El Mozote, in Morazán department, torturing and killing 767 men,
women, and children over the course of three days. It would be the single larg-
est massacre of the war.
Combat between the army and the insurgents was initiated largely by the
FMLN, which inºicted terrible losses on the ESAF. In 1981, government
troops suffered an astounding 3,827 casualties, or 19.1 percent of the force.122
Without even rudimentary medical evacuation capabilities, one-third of sol-
diers wounded in the ªeld died from their injuries.123 The ESAF high com-
mand soon abandoned offensive action for fear its forces were on the verge of
collapse.124 In September 1981, senior ofªcers at U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM) warned that the Salvadoran military was losing the war, a view
echoed by the State Department and the National Security Council.125 This
gloomy assessment was punctuated by an FMLN raid on the Ilopango Air
Base, in the capital of San Salvador, that destroyed or damaged 70 percent of
the country’s military aircraft.126 With an estimated 13,000 political murders in
1981, mostly attributed to the security forces and the death squads, and human
rights groups denouncing “a systemic and brutal policy of government-
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sponsored intimidation and repression,” the Salvadoran government was in-
creasingly isolated internationally.127 Western European countries suspended
assistance, and some even extended diplomatic recognition to the FMLN.128
The situation in El Salvador emerged as a subject of contention on Capitol
Hill. In December 1981, congressional Democrats passed an amendment to the
foreign aid bill requiring President Reagan to certify every six months that
the Salvadoran government was (1) making a concerted effort to comply with
international human rights standards; (2) achieving substantial control over
the armed forces to prevent the torture or murder of civilians; (3) making
continued progress in implementing economic, political, and land reforms;
(4) promising to hold elections; and (5) attempting to bring the murderers of
the American missionaries and land-reform experts to trial.129 If the president
could not make this certiªcation, Congress would cut off all military assistance
to El Salvador. This certiªcation requirement attempted to push the United
States back toward a conditionality strategy, which the administration op-
posed because, in the words of United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick,
it was “undermining the conªdence of vulnerable allies.”130 The all-or-nothing
nature of the terms of certiªcation left little room to calibrate aid to the level of
Salvadoran compliance. Consequently, on three occasions in 1982 and 1983, the
Reagan administration complied with the letter but not the spirit of the law by
certifying progress in order to keep aid ºowing, despite limited or even nonex-
istent evidence of the consolidation of civilian authority, improvements in mil-
itary discipline, or a reduction in human rights abuses.131
military reforms languish, political reforms advance. In the early
1980s, the ESAF lacked trained ofªcers, standardized equipment, enough sol-
diers to sustain offensive operations, and an adequate intelligence capability
for irregular war.132 U.S. military observers judged that the force was “unpre-
pared, strategically, tactically, organizationally, or equipment-wise to confront
a credible guerrilla force or insurgency.”133 As a result, the 55-man U.S. mili-
tary assistance group in El Salvador had two key goals: (1) to expand and
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modernize the ESAF so that it could take on the FMLN, and (2) to alter the
ESAF’s operational and tactical approach to counterinsurgency. Conditionality
was not employed to pressure the Salvadoran military to heed U.S. advice.
Over the course of the civil war, with U.S. assistance, the army nearly tripled
to 56,000 men, who were issued modern weapons and equipment; several new
heliborne rapid reaction battalions were created to attack large FMLN forma-
tions; and the Salvadoran air force was modernized.134 Providing a military
with advanced weapons and recruiting new enlisted personnel is signiªcantly
easier, however, than it is to change its mode of operations. The United States
called for the Salvadoran army to abandon its defensive posture and under-
take aggressive, small-unit operations, carried out day and night, to seize the
initiative from the FMLN. Rather than chasing the guerrillas all over the coun-
try, the ESAF was advised to concentrate its efforts on the country’s main
population centers and economic heartland. It was envisioned that the ESAF
would systemically clear the insurgent presence from the most important sec-
tions of the country before moving on to the peripheral areas dominated by
the guerrillas. In a classic “clear, hold, build” model, civic action and develop-
ment in these cleared zones would be undertaken to win popular support.135
A lack of effective leadership and a continued tolerance of institutional vio-
lence, however, stymied efforts to implement these measures. Despite the
serious military challenge posed by the FMLN, many ofªcers approached
the conºict as a “nine-to-ªve war,” returning to San Salvador to see their fami-
lies on weekends while their troops remained in the ªeld.136 U.S. entreaties to
promote capable and aggressive ofªcers to leadership roles went unheeded,
as ESAF leaders prioritized advancing the careers of classmates and cronies
rather than enhancing military effectiveness.137 With the exception of the rapid
reaction battalions, which embraced small-unit tactics and achieved battle-
ªeld results disproportionate to their size, Salvadoran ofªcers selectively ad-
hered to U.S. guidance. Thus, the army retained its preference for ineffectual
large-unit sweeps by road-bound forces and conªned its operations to the day-
light hours to avoid ambushes, surrendering the night to the insurgents. But
even if the army had embraced aggressive small-unit operations against
the guerrillas, efforts to win popular support would have been stymied by the
ESAF high command’s inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the problem
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that “extreme rightist terrorism and institutional violence” posed for an effec-
tive counterinsurgency strategy.138 No amount of civic action or development
projects would rally civilians to the government’s cause when the armed
forces were the primary source of human rights abuses.
While attempts to transform the Salvadoran military foundered, political re-
form, which was one of the congressional certiªcation requirements, showed
greater promise. Elections for a constituent assembly that would draft a consti-
tution were scheduled for March 28, 1982. The Reagan administration saw
the electoral exercise as a key means of building support for the Salvadoran
government, while disarming its domestic opponents by enticing the far right
into the political process and demonstrating the limited political support for
the insurgents.
The Christian Democrats and the former party of the oligarchy, the PCN,
were joined in the contest by the new Nationalist Republican Alliance
(ARENA), headed by Robert D’Aubuisson. The Salvadoran electoral commis-
sion also recognized several parties allied with the FMLN as legitimate politi-
cal entities and offered to facilitate their campaigns from exile via television if
security concerns made physically returning to El Salvador too dangerous.139
The insurgents rejected the offer, however, insisting that they should be
brought into a power-sharing government with authority proportional to their
relative military capability.140
In a contest that has been judged to be “relatively free, fair and competitive,”
85 percent of El Salvador’s eligible voters went to the polls in the face of
FMLN threats to kill anyone seeking to participate in the election.141 The
Christian Democrats ªnished on top; ARENA ªnished second; and the PCN
came in third. The country’s archbishop declared the turnout a clear “vote in
favor of peace, democracy, and justice,” and called upon the FMLN to “accept
the judgment of the people and lay down their arms.”142
In Washington, elation quickly turned to alarm when it became clear
that ARENA and the PCN had won enough seats between them to form
a right-wing government that sidelined the Christian Democrats and
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named D’Aubuisson as provisional president. The United States promised to
cut aid to a D’Aubuisson-led government, but its past inducement policies
reduced the credibility of the threat.143 As a senior ARENA ofªcial told a re-
porter, “The United States has never cut off aid anywhere for very long or
even entirely. Reagan will never let the Communists win here. It’s just a com-
plete bluff.”144
In the face of this intransigence, the Reagan administration warned the
Salvadoran military and political leaders that continued U.S. support required
(1) a national unity government that included the Christian Democrats; (2) sus-
tained political and economic reforms, including land reform and progress in
controlling violence; and (3) presidential elections.145 Alarmed by the U.S.
threat, the military announced that exclusion of the Christian Democrats was
unacceptable and compelled the formation of a provisional government led by
Álvaro Alfredo Magaña Borja, a nonpolitical banker with close ties to the mili-
tary and the imprimatur of the U.S. embassy.146
Following the election, the Reagan administration turned its attention to
sustaining the land reform program. The agrarian reform program initiated by
the junta in 1980 had three parts. In phase 1, the country’s largest land-
holdings, those in excess of 500 hectares (2 square miles), accounting for ap-
proximately 15 percent of farmland, had been seized and given to peasant
cooperatives. Phase 2 affected medium-sized estates from 100 hectares to
500 hectares, but its implementation had been delayed. The ªnal component
was the “land-to-the-tiller” program, which allowed sharecroppers to pur-
chase up to 7 hectares of farmland that they currently leased from their
landlords. With El Salvador’s economy stagnating, the right-wing parties
dominating the constituent assembly attempted to boost the production of ex-
port crops by halting the land-to-the-tiller program.147 This violation of aid
conditions drew a swift reaction, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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voted to cut scheduled military aid by 60 percent if the Salvadoran govern-
ment failed to implement the program.148 Although the Salvadoran ofªcer
corps did not have particularly strong views on the importance of land reform,
in the face of this threat both Defense Minister García and the army chief
of staff publically endorsed the program, dispatching soldiers to return
thousands of illegally evicted peasants to their farms.149 In moments of crisis,
conditions on American military aid and clear threats to suspend it re-
peatedly proved to be the key to mobilizing the military to support U.S.-
backed reforms.150
conditionality and the “new contract.” From the U.S. standpoint, the
1982 elections had generated positive political momentum in El Salvador;
however, the death squads were undermining efforts to defeat the insurgency
and build a democracy. In a direct challenge to the Salvadoran and U.S. gov-
ernments, right-wing paramilitaries unleashed a wave of violence against
union organizers, peasant groups, and Christian Democrats. The Reagan ad-
ministration hoped to co-opt the leaders of the far left into the political process,
but that would never happen so long as their lives were constantly at risk.
On the battleªeld, the FMLN concentrated its forces into large formations
that sought to confront and defeat the ESAF militarily in a series of quasi-
conventional offensives. Between June 1982 and June 1983, the army suffered a
crippling 6,815 casualties (21 percent of the force), which was double the num-
ber of losses from the previous twelve months.151 “There were days at the end
of 1983,” U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering recalled, “when we wondered
whether we would make it through the next two or three months.”152 In Hugh
Byrne’s judgment, “According to all indicators—ESAF casualties, arms taken,
prisoners captured, terrain controlled, major towns and army positions
taken, infrastructure damaged or destroyed, level of enemy morale—the guer-
rillas were winning the war.”153
In the United States, public support for the administration’s El Salvador
policy was anemic, and congressional opposition was growing. With progress
on the investigation into the missionary murders “marginal at best,” Congress
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conditioned 30 percent of the $64.8 million in military aid appropriated for
ªscal year 1984 on a trial and verdict in the case.154 Given the deteriorating
military situation in El Salvador and the strong opposition to its policies in the
United States, the Reagan administration needed a new approach.
An interagency policy review in July 1983 concluded that U.S. efforts in
El Salvador were being hindered by “critical issues of troop motivation, treat-
ment of civilians and military discipline.”155 In San Salvador the U.S. ambassa-
dor, Dean Hinton, insisted that the time had come to force the Salvadorans to
follow American guidance: “The more the [Salvadoran government] needs our
assistance, the more leverage we have. What we need to do is use it in concrete
cases. . . . [Otherwise,] we will have strengthened the position of those
Salvadorans, probably a majority, who believe and assert that no matter
what they do or do not do, the U.S. will support and protect them against a
Communist takeover.”156 In theory, congressional certiªcation might provide
such leverage; however, the administration’s decision to issue certiªcations ir-
respective of Salvadoran compliance was subverting the process. Conse-
quently, the State Department argued Salvadoran leaders have “not been
motivated to take the minimal actions required to help us sustain our
support.”157 Embracing the need for real conditionality, the interagency task
force recommended forging “a new and reliable contract” that explicitly
identiªed what the Salvadorans must do to win—including the “elimination
of military participation in death squads”—and what assistance the United
States would provide in return.158
In December 1983, Vice President George H.W. Bush was secretly dis-
patched to San Salvador to negotiate the new contract. He carried with him a
letter from Reagan stressing that it was more important than ever to show dra-
matic progress in areas such as elections, land reform, and human rights.159
Forcefully denouncing the death squads as “right-wing fanatics” and “cow-
ardly terrorists,” Bush warned Salvadoran leaders that “every murderous act
they commit poisons the well of friendship between our two countries.”160 In a
series of private meetings with President Magaña, the minister of defense, and
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senior military commanders, Bush laid out the Reagan administration’s terms:
(1) arrest former National Guard Capt. Eduardo Avila for the murders of the
American land-reform experts and agree to a timeline for the prosecution of
that case, as well as for the murders of several other U.S. citizens; (2) explicitly
condemn death squad violence, send a list of three military ofªcers and
three civilians with known links to death squads into exile, and implement
due process procedures for suspects detained by the security forces; (3) pub-
licly commit to support the March 1984 presidential elections; and (4) com-
plete constitutional action on land reform that would protect the agricultural
co-operatives and the land-to-the-tiller program while moving forward on the
expropriation of smaller landholdings.161 Emphasizing that these issues “can-
not be set aside since our support hinges directly on all of them,” Bush an-
nounced a one-month deadline for their execution, so that there would be
tangible evidence of progress when the U.S. Congress returned from its
Christmas recess.162 “Without actions in these areas, there is no point in trying
to obtain additional funds for El Salvador,” he warned, “and to be honest we
will not even make the effort because it would be fruitless.”163
The reward for compliance was to be sufªcient U.S. military aid to ªeld
forty-two additional army battalions, as well as attack aircraft, helicopters, and
an enhancement of El Salvador’s airborne medical evacuation capability, the
latter of which was critical for boosting troop morale.164 Behind the scenes,
President Magaña had advised Bush to set tight deadlines for compliance be-
cause “our military will agree to anything if there is no time deadline con-
nected with it.”165 Indeed, the Salvadoran leader suggested that Congress’s
threat to cut aid was “very important in persuading the commanders to act
positively and act soon.”166
Within the military, several senior ofªcers denounced the Reagan adminis-
tration’s “arm-twisting tactics” at a time when “Salvadoran soldiers are shed-
ding their blood in the ªght against Communism so that U.S. soldiers will not
have to do the same.”167 Ultimately, however, the threat of an aid suspension
and the promise of sufªcient support to defeat the insurgents was too much
for the high command to ignore. As the defense minister bluntly admitted,
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“We know that improving our image is worth millions of dollars of aid for
the country.”168
Days after Bush’s visit, thirty-one senior ofªcers signed a proclamation sup-
porting a crackdown on the death squads. The three military ofªcers on Bush’s
death squad list were removed by the ESAF high command. Several of the
named civilians also lost their jobs in government; however, the latter could
not legally be forced into exile.169 In accordance with the U.S. conditions, the
Salvadoran government introduced new due process requirements for sus-
pects detained by the security forces; the ESAF pledged to defend the 1984
presidential election; and the army pressured the Constituent Assembly into
extending the land-to-the-tiller program. The army also saw that Captain Avila
was arrested for his role in the murders of the American land-reform experts,
and prevented his uncle, the president of the Salvadoran Supreme Court, from
interfering in the case.170
Initial assessments by Central Intelligence Agency analysts suggested that
the Salvadoran government was taking only symbolic steps against the right-
wing paramilitaries; however, death squad activity declined signiªcantly in
the wake of the U.S. ultimatum and remained low for the next several years.171
By the ªrst quarter of 1984, the U.S. embassy was reporting that it was un-
aware of any assassinations of political activists, nor had any known death
squads claimed responsibility for any killings since Bush’s visit.172 As the high
command continued to back reform, the gap between the military and the far
right appeared to be growing.173 The improvements were incremental, and
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Salvadoran compliance was grudging and subject to backsliding; but com-
pared with past efforts, the Reagan administration’s conditionality approach
had achieved signiªcant success.
electing duarte. In 1984 Napoleon Duarte defeated Roberto D’Aubuisson
to become president in the ªrst truly democratic election in Salvadoran his-
tory.174 Marshaling support from a coalition of labor unions and peasant
groups, and bolstered by U.S. ªnancing, Duarte promised to accelerate land re-
form, negotiate with the FMLN, and allow nonviolent protests.175
In his ªrst weeks in ofªce, Duarte disbanded several units in the Treasury
Police and the National Police known to house death squads. He also replaced
the three security force commanders with respected ofªcers favored by the
U.S. embassy.176 Several senior army ofªcers and more than 100 members of
the public security forces suspected of human rights abuses were also removed
from their positions or dismissed.177 Although these reforms did not eradicate
the death squads, extrajudicial killings plunged 80 percent, from an average of
105 per month in 1983 to 18 per month in 1984 and fewer than a dozen per
month in 1985.178 Duarte’s ability to reshape the military in the face of an
ofªcer corps seeking to protect its institutional prerogatives above all else was
unprecedented, and resulted directly from the ESAF’s recognition that access
to continued U.S. aid required winning congressional approval.179
Within weeks of Duarte’s election, the suspects accused of murdering the
American missionaries were prosecuted. Five guardsmen were convicted and
sentenced to thirty-ªve years in prison. With its pressure tactics having
achieved the desired result, the United States released the $19.4 million in mili-
tary aid tied to the outcome.180
Although the insurgents had pushed the Salvadoran military to the brink of
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collapse in late 1983, an expanding army, supported by U.S.-supplied aircraft,
was able to blunt the FMLN’s quasi-conventional large-unit operations and
force the insurgents to reconsider their military strategy.181 By mid-1984, U.S.
efforts were ªnally registering visible success: El Salvador had its ªrst demo-
cratically elected president; the far right had been co-opted into the political
process but kept out of power; the insurgency’s military offensives had been
contained; extrajudicial killings had fallen signiªcantly; and the murderers of
the American missionaries had been brought to justice. Yet, this very success
would undermine the means by which it had been achieved.
return to stalemate, 1985–92
Following Duarte’s presidential win, Congress and the Reagan administration
relaxed their use of conditions on aid to El Salvador.182 Some proponents con-
tinued to insist that conditionality was still required “to spur reforms that
must occur if a military victory by the left is to be avoided,” but these voices
were a distinct minority.183 As the assistant secretary of state for the Western
Hemisphere testiªed to Congress, although conditionality “served a useful
purpose, the need has passed.”184 In a bipartisan effort to bolster Duarte,
Congress granted El Salvador a military aid package of $196 million for 1984,
nearly two-and-a-half times the $81.3 million approved in 1983, and autho-
rized an additional $123 million for the following year.185 With the exception of
a symbolic $5 million linked to the arrest and prosecution of a second ofªcer
involved in the murders of the land reform experts—and the proviso that aid
would be suspended in the event of a coup—U.S. military assistance was no
longer conditioned on reforms in El Salvador.
The impact of this policy change was seen almost instantly, as the ARENA/
PCN–dominated National Assembly repealed the land-to-the-tiller law over
Duarte’s objection.186 Despite winning a majority in the 1985 assembly elec-
tions, without conditions on U.S. aid supporting their reform proposals, the
Christian Democrats could not exert much inºuence over their political oppo-
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nents. With military aid freely ºowing, the ESAF blocked civilian investiga-
tions into human rights abuses by ofªcers. The end of conditionality also
removed the pressure that had kept death squad activity in check, and by
1988 a modest increase in extrajudicial killings was raising concerns within the
U.S. embassy.187
Under Duarte, the one area where the United States continued to employ
conditionality was economics. Real gross domestic product in El Salvador had
declined 23 percent since 1979, unemployment was 30 percent, and inºation
hovered around 22 percent. With the costs of the war consuming half of the na-
tional budget, the government was running an annual deªcit—ªnanced by the
United States—of $100 million.188 To reduce government spending, control
inºation, and decrease the economy’s dependence on commodity exports, the
United States Agency for International Development began to attach condi-
tions to its economic aid. In November 1984, it required Duarte to devalue the
colon in order to gain $65 million in economic assistance.189 When that failed to
turn around the ailing economy, fourteen months later the Agency again pres-
sured Duarte into devaluing the currency and adopting austerity measures—
such as capping wages and raising gas prices by 50 percent.190 Despite these
measures’ signiªcant unpopularity, the Salvadoran government had little
choice but to comply with the United States’ conditions. As the country’s plan-
ning minister bluntly stated, “Without U.S. aid, we would be absolutely broke
and inºation would be totally out of control.”191
resisting counterinsurgency. As the ESAF grew in strength, the FMLN
ceased its use of large formations and moved to a more traditional guerrilla
war strategy. The insurgents’ use of ambushes and land mines inºicted a
steady toll on government forces, but the ESAF remained unwilling to adopt
a small-unit counterinsurgency strategy.192 Instead, military commanders con-
tinued to favor a conventional approach: employing battalion-sized units in
operations backed by close air support and heavy artillery to chase down
small bands of guerrillas.193 Unwillingness to follow U.S. advice was not an
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issue of capacity. As a frustrated American military trainer noted, “The
Salvadoran Army has been thoroughly trained in U.S. counterinsurgency
tactics and they can do them well—the problem is getting them to actually
use these tactics.”194 Salvadoran ofªcers believed that confronting and defeat-
ing the guerrillas could resolve the conºict faster than U.S. counterinsur-
gency strategies could; yet ironically, doing so was returning the war to a
stalemate.195 Nevertheless, the United States did not condition military aid on
the ESAF’s adoption of its tactical advice. Instead senior ofªcials told their
Salvadoran counterparts that “our partnership does not require you to adopt
any particular doctrine,” provided you “respect the welfare of civilians and
[ªght] clearly in support of democracy.”196
On the other side, a steady stream of defections saw the FMLN shrink from
a high of 12,000 guerrilla ªghters in 1983 to 6,000 by 1987. Although the insur-
gents could deny the government control over one-third of the country, they
could not exploit the growing opposition to Duarte’s government and U.S.-
imposed economic austerity measures to expand their support base.197 Three
successful elections had convinced large majorities that the ballot box could
bring a degree of change. Moreover, the guerrillas’ economic sabotage, as well
as their widespread use of land mines and a campaign of urban terrorism,
alienated major segments of the population. The military’s unwillingness
to adapt to counterinsurgency and the insurgents’ limited appeal stalemated
the conºict: neither side could gain the upper hand, nor was either at risk of
defeat. One Salvadoran pithily summarized the plight of his fellow peas-
ants, “The army comes and goes. The guerrillas come and go. We hide under
our beds.”198
the 1989 “ªnal offensive.” For Duarte and his Christian Democrats, the
military stalemate only deepened their problems: their political ineffectiveness
and the unpopularity of U.S.-imposed economic austerity measures, which
saw the economy grow by 1 percent between 1984 and 1989, led their approval
ratings to plummet. In the 1989 elections to succeed Duarte, ARENA put forth
Alfredo Cristiani, a Georgetown-educated coffee grower with no ties to the
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death squads. Over the course of the decade, urban entrepreneurs, rather than
traditional landlords, came to dominate the party, and its politics moderated.
Running on a platform promising economic recovery and openness to negotia-
tions with the FMLN, Cristiani swept thirteen of the country’s fourteen depart-
ments.199 In ofªce, he attacked corruption and instituted economic reforms
to jump-start the ailing economy.200 Duarte had signed on to Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias’s Central American Peace Accord in 1987, which sought
to resolve the various civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.
Cristiani was, however, better positioned to gain the military’s support for dia-
logue with the insurgents, and he called for negotiations two days after win-
ning ofªce.
Cristiani’s political overtures were conducted from a position of perceived
strength, but in fact, the FMLN was consolidating its forces for one ªnal mili-
tary thrust. On November 11, 1989—two days after the Berlin Wall came
down—the FMLN launched its largest offensive of the war. In a coup de main,
2,000 insurgents captured parts of San Salvador, ranging from the poorest bar-
rios to upper-class neighborhoods, while unsuccessfully attempting to assassi-
nate President Cristiani and the military high command.201 The intensity of the
surprise assault sent shockwaves around the country. Nevertheless, as in 1981,
the Salvadoran people did not respond to the call for a mass uprising. In a
three-week campaign, the military fought block by block to recapture the city,
at times employing helicopter gunships and ªghter aircraft to dislodge the in-
surgents from their strongholds.202 During the ªghting, the security forces de-
tained union members, opposition leaders, and left-wing clergy. Despite
declaring a state of emergency, however, the government did not initiate a sys-
tematic campaign of violence against suspected subversives.203 William
Stanley has attributed this marked restraint to the ESAF’s fear of alienating the
United States. The military had only a one-month supply of fuel and ammuni-
tion, while operations relied heavily on helicopters that required maintenance
and spare parts that only the United States could provide.204
The insurgent assault shocked Washington, where it was widely compared
to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam—itself a considered a “dismal military
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failure and a brilliant political success.”205 The FMLN spent nearly two years
preparing for the operation and suffered signiªcant casualties as a result. Nev-
ertheless, in the aftermath of the 1989 offensive, the Salvadoran and U.S. gov-
ernments radically reevaluated the insurgents’ military capabilities.206 Within
weeks, the SOUTHCOM commander informed Congress that the Salvadoran
government could not defeat the guerrillas.207
the jesuit murders and the return of conditionality. Despite its rela-
tive restraint during the ªghting, the ESAF managed to snatch political defeat
from the jaws of military victory. Five days into the offensive, elements of
the Atlacatl rapid-reaction battalion raided the Jesuit-run Central American
University. Acting on the instructions of Col. Guillermo Benavides—the com-
mander of a special security zone in the capital—members of the unit executed
the university rector, ªve priests, and two bystanders. The Jesuits were promi-
nent scholars and a key conduit for the government’s dialogue with the far
left. Many in the ESAF, however, viewed them as the intellectual architects of
the revolution.208
The murders shattered the bipartisan consensus in Washington. Even
though the FMLN offensive was still under way, some members of Congress
called for the immediate suspension of aid, while other legislators warned
that next year’s appropriations would be cut unless the perpetrators were
quickly arrested.209 To underscore this position, the U.S. ambassador and
the SOUTHCOM commander bluntly warned Salvadoran military leaders
that “if by the end of January 1990 the [government and military] have not
done everything humanly possible to ªnd the guilty parties, all security assis-
tance to El Salvador could be halted by Congress as its ªrst order of business
in the new year.”210
The threat led to rapid results. In early January 1990, President Cristiani an-
nounced that nine suspects, including Colonel Benavides and two lieutenants,
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had been arrested for the murders.211 Yet, the following month, while congrat-
ulating Cristiani on progress in the investigation and emphasizing the need
to move it forward, now-President George H.W. Bush sent the Salvadoran
government a conºicting signal by promising to increase El Salvador’s
$131 million economic aid package by $50 million.212
In the months after President Bush’s announcement, the Jesuit case stag-
nated. Despite U.S. urging for “a thorough and timely investigation,” the lead-
ership of the Salvadoran military stonewalled, in the apparent belief that
interest in the case would eventually disappear.213 As evidence accumulated
that senior ofªcers had attempted to cover up the crime, however, Bush ad-
ministration ofªcials who had previously been “vehemently opposed” to con-
ditionality began to recognize that “now we have to play hardball . . . we’re
now basically supporting the move to condition or cut military aid.”214
To demonstrate displeasure with the lack of progress in the case, the United
States withheld $19.65 million in military assistance.215 The aid would be re-
leased, President Cristiani was informed, only if the military leadership com-
pelled potential witnesses in the ESAF to cooperate with the investigating
judge.216 The impact of these conditions on military aid was undercut by the
fact that the embargoed items were chosen on the basis that “withholding
these materials will not greatly affect the ESAF’s basic ability to ªght the war,
but will cause inconvenience.”217 Unsurprisingly, Salvadoran interlocutors in-
formed the U.S. defense attaché that senior ofªcers did not feel much pressure
to comply with the U.S. demands.218
The United States further undermined its position when it released $250,000
worth of spare parts for Salvadoran helicopters in late September 1990. The aid
was notionally granted in return for “positive, though insufªcient, progress”
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in the Jesuit case, but the parts in question were identiªed as “critical compo-
nents” for the Salvadoran air force to remain ready against a guerrilla threat.219
President Cristiani and Salvadoran military leaders were informed that, de-
spite the release of the spare parts, military assistance remained conditioned
on the ESAF’s cooperation with the Jesuit murder case. Within weeks, how-
ever, military commanders were pressing the U.S. embassy for the release of
additional “vital” aid to maintain the army’s armored personnel carriers with-
out having met U.S. conditions.220 In San Salvador, the frustrated U.S. ambas-
sador saw this as a clear indication of the hollowness with which the
Salvadorans perceived the American threat.221
conditions, negotiations, and prosecution of murder suspects. In the
aftermath of the 1989 “ªnal offensive,” the political positions of the Salvadoran
government and the FMLN underwent a transformation. The scope of the of-
fensive appeared to dash any hopes of an imminent government victory.
Moreover, the FMLN’s acquisition of advanced surface-to-air missiles hobbled
the Salvadoran air force which, in turn, constrained the aggressiveness of the
army’s operations.222 At the same time, the insurgents recognized that they
were unlikely to trigger a popular insurrection in El Salvador.223 Within weeks
of the 1989 ªnal offensive, both the Salvadoran government and the FMLN
had contacted the UN to help with mediation. This began a two-year period in
which the two sides fought while they negotiated. To exert pressure on the
Salvadoran government to make a deal, Congress returned to conditionality.
It cut military aid for El Salvador by 50 percent and warned that it would
withhold the remaining balance if the government failed to negotiate in good
faith with the FMLN for a permanent settlement, if it did not thoroughly in-
vestigate the Jesuit killings, and if it employed large-scale violence against ci-
vilians.224 As an incentive for the FMLN to reach a compromise as well,
Congress included a provision restoring the suspended military aid if the in-
surgents failed to negotiate with the government in good faith or if they re-
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ceived signiªcant military assistance from abroad. The sharp reduction in
military assistance was a shock for those in El Salvador who believed that the
United States would sustain them indeªnitely.225 After initially signaling
that he would restore the full amount of military aid, President Bush, who was
interested in winding down U.S. involvement in El Salvador, embraced condi-
tionality as a means to move the peace process and the Jesuit murder investi-
gation forward.226
In response to the pressure from Washington, the Salvadoran government
conducted a series of intense negotiations with the FMLN during the fall and
winter of 1991. On January 16, 1992, the two sides signed a UN-brokered peace
accord, bringing an end to a war that had taken 75,000 lives and exhausted the
country. In the ªnal settlement, the size of the army was reduced by 50 percent,
and civilian supremacy over the armed forces was ªnally established. A new
civilian police force replaced the security forces. The FMLN abandoned its de-
mand for a power-sharing agreement, instead becoming a political party that
would compete for power legally.
Meanwhile, Colonel Benavides was found guilty of ordering the murders of
the Jesuits and, along with an accomplice, was sentenced to thirty years in
prison. Three more ofªcers were convicted for their roles in attempting to
cover up the crime. The case demonstrated how far El Salvador had come in
the past decade. Not only was this the ªrst time a senior ofªcer had been tried
for human rights abuses, but as William LeoGrande noted: “For the ªrst time
in modern Salvadoran history, two ofªcers were convicted for the politically
motivated murder of civilians.”227 This success, however, would at best be in-
complete: the investigation did not extend to the senior ofªcers who ordered
the killings.228
The Dynamics of Patron-Client Relations in the Salvador Civil War
At the outset of U.S. involvement, El Salvador was governed by a weak civil-
military junta that possessed only notional control over elements of the
security forces and the far right, who pursued their own dirty war against
suspected leftists and government reformers. Repression, as well as economic
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and social grievances, drove support for a guerrilla movement that became
the most potent in Latin America. In response, the United States tried to en-
courage a broad counterinsurgency approach that focused on building the
Salvadoran government’s legitimacy by ameliorating grievances and advanc-
ing democratization, while developing a military capable of confronting the
insurgents. Although the United States and its Salvadoran partners had a
shared aim of preventing the FMLN from taking power, the measures that the
United States deemed necessary to achieve these aims frequently met with re-
sistance from elements of the Salvadoran military or government. Neverthe-
less, the United States succeeded in convincing the Salvadoran government to
implement some political and economic reforms; however, it achieved less
inºuence over the military’s counterinsurgency tactics, and its impact on the
military’s human rights record was mixed. What accounts for this variance
in outcomes?
In the course of its twelve-year involvement in El Salvador, the United States
employed two strategies for using aid to inºuence the local government:
inducement and conditionality (see table 1). On balance, the El Salvador case
provides more evidence to support the effectiveness of the conditionality strat-
egy than it does for the inducement approach. The use of conditions on U.S.
aid was associated with Salvadoran compliance, even in areas where reform or
policy change had previously been resisted. The Carter administration suc-
cessfully employed conditionality to broker the Christian Democrats’ entry
into the junta and stave off a right-wing coup attempt in 1980. The Reagan
administration’s threat to suspend military aid spurred the ESAF to defend
the land-to-the-tiller program and compel the formation of a coalition gov-
ernment including the Christian Democrats. Vice President Bush’s “new con-
tract” in 1983 tied aid to suppressing right-wing paramilitary groups, which
led to a sharp and lasting decline in death squad murders. Both congress and
the Reagan administration made assistance contingent on democratization.
Even scholars critical of U.S. involvement in El Salvador acknowledge
that “had the United States not insisted on elections as a condition for aid,
El Salvador’s transition to elected government and the ªrst steps towards
transforming the social elite into a political class would have come later, if at
all.”229 Similarly, unpopular economic austerity measures, negotiations with
the FMLN, and the prosecution of the Jesuit case were all advanced by condi-
tions on aid.
In contrast, grants of U.S. assistance were not met with reciprocal compli-
ance by the Salvadorans. After Carter rushed military aid to El Salvador in
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1981, the ESAF reneged on reform pledges while death squad violence in-
creased. Following Duarte’s win in 1984, U.S. military aid was no longer con-
ditioned on the ESAF’s human rights practices, and by 1988, extrajudicial
killings had made a modest resurgence.230 Conditionality was also absent in
areas where the United States had the least inºuence: the military aspects of
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Table 1. Summary of Sixteen Patron-Client Inºuence Episodes in El Salvador’s Civil War
Date U.S. Goal Strategy Compliance
1980 Christian Democrats to join junta conditionality high
1980 prevent military coup conditionality high
1980 improve in human rights in return for
helicopters
conditionality lowa
1980 restructure junta under President Duarte and
purge of human rights abusers
conditionality high
1980 control human rights abuses and death squads inducementb low
1981–83 sustain junta reforms and reduce human rights
abuses
inducement low
1981–91 adapt the ESAF for counterinsurgency by
embracing small unit tactics
inducement low
1981 prevent right-wing coup and move missionary
murder case forward
conditionality high
1981–84 improve human rights standards, ensure
elections, defend land reform, and investigate
murders of missionaries and land-reform
experts
conditionality lowc
1982 include Christian Democrats in a coalition
government
conditionality high
1982 defend the “land-to-the-tiller” program conditionality high
1983 Bush’s “new contract”: condemn death squad
violence, support elections, defend land
reform, pursue murder investigations
conditionality high
1984–85 implement economic austerity measures conditionality high
1984–86 prosecute additional suspects in land-reform
murders
conditionality lowd
1990 promote ESAF cooperation with Jesuit
investigation
conditionality lowe
1990–91 prosecute Jesuit murders and negotiate with
the FMLN
conditionality high
a Partial compliance derailed by Ronald Reagan’s election
b Conditions attached, but U.S. aid rushed in the wake of 1981 ªnal offensive before
Salvadoran government compliance
c Congressional certiªcation requirements subverted by the Reagan administration
d Only $5 million in military aid out of $100 million was conditioned on resolving the case
e Conditions attached to equipment speciªcally chosen so that “withholding these materials
will not greatly affect the ESAF’s basic ability to ªght the war”
the counterinsurgency campaign. Although at times military aid was condi-
tioned on the ESAF’s treatment of civilians or its support for reform measures,
it was never contingent on changes to its counterinsurgency tactics. Even
when it was clear that the army’s failure to embrace small-unit operations had
produced a military stalemate, the United States did not attempt to force a
change.231 The fact that the United States achieved more success in inºuencing
the Salvadoran government in the political and economic spheres than in the
military sphere is not surprising given that conditionality was employed in the
former, but not in the latter.
The use of conditionality did not result in total compliance with U.S. prefer-
ences on every occasion. In some instances, other factors undercut the credibil-
ity of U.S. conditions. The 1980 helicopter deal, for example, generated partial
compliance by the ESAF, but the credibility of the threat to withhold aid was
dissipated by Carter’s defeat in the 1980 election before all the terms of the
deal were fulªlled. At other times, conditionality’s credibility was affected by
the relative importance of the aid involved. The Bush administration efforts to
use conditionality to pressure the Salvadoran military into cooperating with
the investigation of the Jesuit murders was undercut by the fact that the sus-
pended aid was speciªcally chosen so that it would not adversely affect ongo-
ing military operations.
All things considered, the evidence reviewed here suggests that a patron’s
inºuence over a client state ºows from the use of tight conditions on aid rather
than on the granting of inducements. As the chief of staff of the Salvadoran
army, Gen. Adolfo Blandón, acknowledged: “I’ll be frank, though some don’t
want to admit it: The conditions the U.S. placed on us helped.”232
A key challenge in employing conditionality when assisting counterinsur-
gency, however, is making a credible threat to withhold aid if the client does
not comply. The very act of helping a local government signals that its survival
is important and links the patron’s reputation to the client’s success. Given
that the patron has an interest in the client’s long-term stability, some scholars
suggest that the client may not believe that aid will really be withheld for non-
compliance.233 Rather, the client may conclude that it will receive aid irrespec-
tive of what it does, because the patron’s desire to defeat the insurgency
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outweighs whatever reform or policy change the patron is trying to compel the
local government to make.
The fact that withholding assistance will impede the broader goal of arrest-
ing an insurgency is no guarantee that the patron will not punish noncompli-
ance. In a number of international interactions, ranging from economic
sanctions to nuclear deterrence, states attempt to coerce each other by making
credible threats to take actions that, if implemented, could inºict serious harm
on the implementing party.234 Unlike nuclear threats, however, the withhold-
ing of aid pending client compliance does not pose an existential threat to the
client’s survival. Except in the most extreme cases, it is unlikely that the local
government will immediately collapse from a single instance of aid suspen-
sion.235 Even in situations where the threat of a complete cut-off of aid is not
believable, the patron can still calibrate conditions to make them more credi-
ble. Breaking an aid package into smaller tranches, for example, each clearly
linked to a speciªc action, offers patrons a way to make believable threats to
withhold aid from their clients without leaving them completely helpless.236
Thus, there is good reason to believe that a client cannot be totally conªdent
that a patron will not withhold aid simply because it has a long-term interest
in the client’s success.237
Nevertheless, it is worth asking if a client state could be so important to U.S.
national security that it would not be possible to make such threats credible? It
is difªcult to predict where the United States will intervene to assist counterin-
surgency in the future, but from a historical standpoint, the countries that have
received aid and support in counterinsurgency from the United States, short of
the intervention of ground troops, were overwhelmingly small, resource-poor
states whose material capabilities (as measured by the Composite Index of
National Capability) were a bare fraction of those of their patron (see table 2).
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These were not countries that were too important to fail; the loss of any one of
these minor client states would have had a minimal impact on the standing or
alliances of a superpower such as the United States.238 Of course, irrespective
of their validity, geopolitical considerations, reputational concerns, or the
fear of falling dominos could lead U.S. policymakers to conclude that a state is
vital to U.S. security even if its material endowments are minimal.239 This
was certainly true in El Salvador, where successive administrations feared
the country would be the ªrst of a string of falling dominos set off by the
Nicaraguan revolution and that a failure to arrest the insurgency would un-
dermine the conªdence of U.S. allies worldwide.240 This belief that El Salvador
was critical to U.S. foreign policy in the region and the reputation of the coun-
try did not prevent Carter, Reagan or Bush from bringing coercive pressure to
bear on their clients in San Salvador via conditions on aid, even on occasions
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Table 2. Completed Counterinsurgency Campaigns Supported by U.S. Indirect
Intervention, 1944–2010
Country Initial Year % USA CINC* Resource Endowment
Greece 1947 1.07% poor
Philippines 1946 0.95% poor
Laos 1959 0.19% poor
Guatemala 1960 0.21% poor
Cambodia 1967 0.51% poor
Morocco 1975 1.88% poor
Nicaragua 1978 0.21% poor
El Salvador 1979 0.35% poor
Croatia 1992 0.85% poor
*CINC stands for Composite Index of National Capability
SOURCE: The list of externally supported insurgencies comes from Christopher Paul et al.,
Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpo-
ration, 2013), pp. 77–78. The Composite Index of National Capability comes from the
National Material Capabilities Dataset version 4.0, as discussed in David J. Singer, “Re-
constructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985,”
International Interactions, Vol. 14 (1987), pp. 115–132. Resource endowment measures the
amount of oil and/or diamonds in a country and comes from Desha Girod, “Foreign Aid
and Post-Conºict Reconstruction,” Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2008, p. 39.
when the local government was clearly losing to the insurgents and appeared
to be on the brink of collapse. At times, it may take more effort to inºuence a
strategically important client government via conditionality, but the client’s
importance should not be a barrier to the use of this tool.
Conclusion
In contemporary and historical interventions to assist counterinsurgency, the
United States has found that its local partners were signiªcant obstacles to suc-
cess. A shared interest in defeating an insurgency does not guarantee that a pa-
tron and its client government will prefer the same policies for carrying out
that task. In theory, U.S. policymakers should assist only those countries with
which their interests and priorities clearly align. In practice, however, the
problem of adverse selection means that the types of governments most in
need of counterinsurgency assistance are largely those that are least likely to
heed U.S. guidance. Consequently, policymakers planning to assist counterin-
surgency will be best served by expecting a contested relationship with the cli-
ent from the outset.
The divergent preferences of local allies (or powerful elements within their
regimes) can lead them to resist U.S. recommendations for responding to inter-
nal violence and instead pursue policies or behaviors that are antithetical to
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Under such circumstances, the patron’s ad-
vice and material support will not necessarily enhance the client’s counterin-
surgency prowess. Therefore, a key focus of attention should be on bringing
the client’s behavior into line with the requirements of the patron.
The case of U.S. aid to El Salvador indicates that imposing conditions on aid,
rather than granting inducements, is more closely associated with client com-
pliance with the patron’s counterinsurgency preferences. Although further
empirical testing is necessary to validate the results, the lesson that condition-
ality is more effective at generating inºuence is an important one because
many of the same contentious patron-client dynamics found in El Salvador
plague the United States’ relations with its counterinsurgency partners today.
This is not to suggest that El Salvador should necessarily be seen as a model
counterinsurgency assistance effort simply because the FMLN was prevented
from overthrowing the Salvadoran government. This outcome came at the cost
of $6 billion in U.S. military and economic assistance over twelve years and the
loss of tens of thousands of Salvadoran lives, and required signiªcant intru-
sion into the political and economic policies of the local government. Even
then, the ability of the United States to affect change in vital areas such as the
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conduct of the armed forces or the country’s economic structures had limits.
There was some improvement in the military’s respect for human rights and
a moderate degree of agrarian reform, but abuses and inequities persisted
throughout the war.241 Merely possessing the ability to inºuence a client’s
counterinsurgency choices is no guarantee that an assistance effort will suc-
ceed or that the costs involved will be proportional to the objectives sought.
Conditions work better than inducements, but their use alone cannot guaran-
tee strategic success.
Five policy ªndings can be extrapolated from this study. First, the need to be
able to credibly threaten to withhold aid in the absence of compliance suggests
that use of a conditionality strategy favors looser and more ambiguous com-
mitments to the client in an effort to create some doubt about the lengths to
which the patron will go to aid it. In other words, if the level of inºuence that a
patron has over its client varies inversely with the perceived level of commit-
ment to that client, the patron will want to maintain a degree of uncertainty
about its future intentions.242
Second, employing conditionality to press a local government for changes to
its counterinsurgency operations is a controversial practice, because the
reºexive response of many ofªcials would be to prop up a failing partner. If
shaping the counterinsurgency behavior of a client state is a priority, however,
pressing it to make changes when it is weak is the way to succeed. The more
directly the insurgents threaten the ruling elites in the local government, the
greater the client’s incentive to cooperate with the patron.243 Conversely,
the client has little reason to undertake reform when the situation is stable and
it is assured of support. When the Salvadoran economy was on the brink of
collapse and the insurgents were defeating the ESAF in the ªeld, successive
U.S. administrations took advantage of the opportunity to use conditionality
to force reform on the Salvadoran government.
Third, in a conditionality-based inºuence strategy, the conditions and their
desired policy outcomes should be as unambiguous as possible, with easily
measureable metrics and clear deadlines for compliance. Vague requirements
that tie aid to demonstrations of “effort” or “progress” introduce a high degree
of subjectivity into the process.
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Fourth, even after an initial reform or policy change occurs, it may be neces-
sary to maintain pressure on the client regime to ensure that it does not seek to
backslide. The protracted effort required to reduce the number of extrajudicial
killings in El Salvador, and their modest resurgence in the late 1980s after pres-
sure was removed, suggests that the patron may have to continue conditions
on aid for a signiªcant period of time to ensure that reforms remain in place
long enough to have their desired effect.
Fifth, if the patron grants one type of aid unconditionally, it may undermine
the credibility of attempts to attach conditions to aid in other realms. A client
government whose survival is deemed important enough to merit uncondi-
tional military assistance, for example, may have reason to question a patron’s
threats to withhold economic aid in the face of noncompliance with a pro-
posed reform. If conditions on aid are to be credible, they must be applied in
all instances.
Counterinsurgency is a challenging undertaking, the difªculties of which
are only magniªed when one state attempts to assist another state in its coun-
terinsurgency effort. Policymakers facing that challenge must recognize that
the prevalent assumption in both counterinsurgency scholarship and U.S.
doctrine—that patron-client preferences will closely align—is wrong. Al-
though it is tempting to think that signiªcant amounts of assistance will easily
shape a client’s behavior and policies, inºuence is more likely to ºow from
tight conditions on aid than from boundless generosity. These conditions must
be carefully structured so that the requirements are measurable and achiev-
able, and that the aid the client desires most—in all likelihood military aid—is
offered as the reward. To enhance its leverage, a patron may need to press its
client government hard to make reforms, even when it is at its weakest, rather
than take immediate measures to strengthen it against the insurgents. These rec-
ommendations to condition aid to a friendly government, to bargain hard with
it, and to exploit its vulnerability may run counter to the instincts of many
policymakers. But sometimes being a good ally means being a stern friend.
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